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Abstract
This paper investigates the robustness of the “two-tiered labor market” experimental
results of Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004) by subjecting relationships to stochastic inter-
ruptions. Using two different subject pools, we first replicate the basic pattern of high
quality private contracting and low quality public contracting. We then study the impact
of exogenous random ‘downturns’ in which firms cannot hire workers for three periods.
Our hypothesis is that 1. job rents are lower in downturns 2. this will lower wages and
effort, unless strong reconnection norms exist. We do find that job rents are lower, but
surprisingly, the downturns do not harm aggregate market efficiency. Stochastic inter-
ruptions delay the formation of relationships, necessitating the use of public offers, which
increases the competitiveness of the short term market. The high tier (private) markets
responds by raising wages, thus increasing average worker surplus per trade. We also find
evidence that 50-50 pre-downturn worker-firm surplus sharing predicts post-downturn re-
connections.
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1 Introduction
Typical employment contracts only loosely specify the duration and terms of employment,
leaving many details implicit.1 Implicit contracts which reflect historical norms are often
called “relational contracts”. Because these contracts are implicit, it is often difficult to
measure their terms directly, but these limited duration contracts often lead to repeated
future contracts. However, circumstances outside of the workers’ performance, such as
stochastic drops in demands for a firm’s products or changes in personal circumstances
of an employer, often affect the probability of future contracts. This paper is an attempt
explore how much these stochastic interruptions affect the labor market.
Because individual level data linking a worker’s pay with productivity are scarce,
experiments in which contract terms can be exogenously manipulated play an important
role in understanding relational contracts. Our paper replicates and extends an experi-
mental “gift exchange” paradigm used by Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004, 2009, henceforth
BFF1 and 2) to study relational contracts. In this paradigm firms offer prepaid wages
and workers who accept wages then exert costly effort. Since effort is not contractible,
there is a classic moral hazard problem; one possible outcome is that workers exert little
effort and firms, anticipating this, pay minimum wages. BFF1 extends the paradigm
by attaching ID numbers to all firms and workers, and allowing “private” offers to be
extended to a particular worker. A two tier labor market emerges rapidly in which pri-
vate contracts sustain high wages and effort while public contracts sustain low wages and
effort.
Our paper makes two contributions. First, we directly replicate the BFF1 experiment
and check its robustness to subject pool and time horizon. The central stylized facts
replicate rather well, though there are some small differences in behavior. Second, and
∗We would like to thank participants of 4th IZA Behavioral Labor Workshop (October 16-18, 2008,
Bonn), ESA 2008, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Martin Brown and Christian Zehnder.
1Most US firms uses “employment at will” clauses, which states that an employment contract of
indefinite duration can be terminated by either the employer or the employee at any time for any reason.
more importantly, we investigate the robustness of relational contracting and market
efficiency to stochastic downturns. In every period of trading, each firm faces a probability
p of being hit by a downturn, in which no hiring is possible for three periods.2
Temporarily removing firms from the labor market creates uncertainty about future
relationships that require the emergence of loyalty norms. These norms determine the
type of firm and worker behavior that signals commitment to rehire a worker and rejoin
a firm after the downturn. These norms are an important part of the effect of stochas-
tic interruptions on relationships, and consequently, on a worker’s future utility of not
shirking (job rents). If loyalty norms are weak, workers will start relationships with new
firms as soon as their firm is hit by a downturn. Returning firms (after downturns) will
then have to dip into the labor market for a new worker. Shirking will be less costly
for a worker since the probability of being rehired is high if they are “fired” (i.e. their
private contract is not renewed), and hence the market may unravel. However, we show
theoretically that with strong loyalty norms, high quality contracts can be maintained
despite stochastic interruptions .
The experimental data shows that while stochastic interruptions do have some dis-
ruptive effects, the net effect is actually beneficial (excluding lost production from down-
turns) in an interesting way. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, job rents (wages
minus effort cost) in downturns are lower than job rents in baseline. However, wages are
actually higher in downturn, especially in the second half of the experiment. But since
efforts are not higher, the average worker profit per trade is significantly higher.
The reason for this is complex: firms, perhaps out of fear of loss earnings from non-
trading periods, demand more out of workers in downturns before renewing relationships.
This delays the separation of the two tiers of the market, improving the wage and effort in
the short term public market to such an extent that it is difficult to get workers to resist
public offers and stick with renewed private contracting. In the end firms are ironically
forced to spend more for the same level of effort. However, the best pairings are largely
unaffected by the interruptions: firms and workers who are sharing their surplus 50-50
before the downturn have strong loyalty norms and reconnect after the downturns. Like
many previous experiments, this positive effect of downturns illustrates the fact that an
expanding labor economics analysis including considerations of reciprocity and fairness
can someimes overturn conventional intuitions.
2Note that our specification was not designed to resemble any particular macroeconomic type of
downturn. (In the economy downturns are often correlated across firms, due to business cycles, and
their length is stochastic rather than fixed.) When downturns are uncorrelated, strategic behavior from
anticipating future downturns is minimized, thus allowing us to better isolate the resilience of relational
contracts from stochastic interruptions.
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2 Theoretical Framework
The celebrated folk theorem in game theory established that payoffs which are Pareto-
superior to those achievable in the one-shot Nash equilibrium can arise given sufficiently
likely repetition of a one-shot game. However, these results are sensitive to disruptions
and noise. For example, tacit collusion among firms to produce their share of monopoly
output dissolves into Cournot behavior when demand fluctuations not directly observable
by firms lower prices sufficiently (Green and Porter, 1982). Furthermore, in theory, if
a worker-firm game is only repeated finitely, there should be shirking in the last period
which unravels to shirking immediately. However, in experiments and naturally-occurring
settings with known finite horizon, cooperation typically occurs until close to the end
(e.g., Camerer, 2003). One explanation for this pattern, in labor market trust settings, is
gift exchange due to norms of reciprocity or moral obligation (e.g., Akerlof, 1982, 1984;
Rabin, 1993; Fehr, Kirschsteiger and Reidl, 1993). That is, firms pay above-market wages
and workers reciprocate the “gift” with costly effort.
BFF1 shows that introducing fair types into a labor market with excess supply makes
it possible to attain a high-efficiency equilibrium. In this equilibrium all firms offer
fair wages and selfish firms offer rent at the last period, inducing both fair and selfish
types to put in the requested effort until the end. A worker who shirks is immediately
punished by nonrenewal of the private contract; shirking hence has a very high cost since
reemployment is unlikely given the excess supply in this labor market. Selfish workers
and fair workers act undistinguishably until the final period, when the selfish workers will
finally shirk. Their followup paper, BFF2, shows that the existence of a high-efficiency
equilibrium does not depend on the threat of unemployment. In a labor market with
excess demand with inequity-averse types,3 the high equilibrium can be attained when
public offers feature lower wages than private repeated offers.
How could stochastic interruption affect behavior? Specifically, what is the impact
of temporarily removing firms from the labor market on the development of relational
contracts?
First, the increased uncertainty of being repaid for high efforts with a renewed contract
may drive workers towards more shirking. On the other hand, the higher threat of possible
exogeneous unemployment may drive employed workers to try to protect their jobs by
consistently delivering high effort.
A second possible effect is that the expected job rents of workers in the high wage-high
effort equilibrium might be lower in the downturn market than in the baseline market
because of the statistical impact of future disruptions. This will generally lead to a lower
sustainable effort level in the downturn market compared to the baseline market.
A third possible effect comes from the prospect of interruption serving as a selection
criterion. In repeated games where the folk theorem applies, there are always inefficient
3Note that BFF2 employ a different behavioral assumption of fair workers than BFF1
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equilibria as well as efficient ones. The fact that there is a possibility of interruption, per
se, could serve as a public correlating device that implements the inefficient equilibrium.
In this paper we introduce the idea that loyalty norms can influence the net effect of
stochastic interruption. Suppose that all firms form relational contracts, and wages and
efforts are high. Then a firm is hit with a shock and exits the market for a known number
of periods. When loyalty norms are strong, the firm’s previous worker simply waits out
the interruption period, and when the firm returns to the market, the firm makes a private
offer to that worker, thus continuing the relationship. This strong loyalty norm would
produce aggregate behavior very similar to the perfectly efficient relational contracting
with “missing data” (from the downturn periods).
On the other extreme, suppose there are no loyalty norms. Then workers laid off in
downturns will immediately accept any public or private offer, and firms returning from
downturns will not expect to rehire old workers, so they will make new public offers and
to kindle new relationships. Then shirking is less costly for the workers and relationship
lengths will be shorter.
The theoretical model presented next illustrates the intuition behind our experiment.
For simplicity, we model the downturn as a single period interruption instead of the
three period interruption in our experiment. Like the framework from BFF1, there is an
excess supply of labor and selfish workers imitate fair workers at period t < T for fear of
unemployment. We use BFF2 behavioral assumptions: all firms are utility maximizers, a
fraction p of workers are fair, and the rest are selfish utility maximizers. In order to model
employment choices while a firm goes into a downturn, we assume there are two firms
and n > 2 workers (which depart from BFF1’s model of a single firm and many workers
or BFF2’s model of a single worker and many firms). We first discuss our prediction for
the baseline labor market before analyzing the downturn market.
Without stochastic interruptions, a single period of the game proceeds as follows:
1. Firms simultaneously offer contracts that stipulate wages and desired effort levels
[w, e˜] to all workers through public offers or to a single worker through private
offers.
2. Workers receive all contracts at once and decide which one (if more than one) to
accept.
3. If a worker accepts the contract, he chooses an actual effort level e ∈ [1, 10] to
deliver. If a worker rejects a contract, the firm can offer another contract.
4. After e is chosen, firm earns 10e− w and worker earns w − c(e) (see Table 2 Row
1 for cost of effort). Unmatched firms earn 0; unmatched workers earn 5.
Stochastic interruptions happens at the beginning of the period before the firm makes
offers. With probability δ, a firm experience a temporary (observable) shock in demand
and cannot hire for one period.
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e˜T 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. c(e˜T ) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
2. wˆ(e˜T ) 5 12 16 22 28 34 40 46 53 59
3. wˆ(e˜T )− c(e˜T ) 5 11 14 18 22 26 30 34 38 41
4. wˆ(e˜T )− 5 0 7 11 17 23 29 35 41 48 54
5. e˜T−1 1 5 7 9 10 10 10 10 10 10
Table 1: Theoretical fair contracts at T and corresponding effort level at T − 1
The utility of a fair worker follows the BFF2 model: workers have a bad conscience if
they do not fulfill a contract that offers an equal (or better) split of surplus. Letting wˆ(e)
denote fair wages, Table 2 Row 2 provide wˆ(e˜) = 5e − c(e)/2 for each effort level. The
marginal disutility b of not fulfilling a fair contract is assumed to be high enough such
that fair workers will always provide the requested effort if they accept a fair contract.
Definition 1. A fair worker is an agent whose utility for an accepted a contract of [w, e˜]
is w − c(e) if w < wˆ(e˜) and w − c(e)− bmax(e˜, e) otherwise.
Proposition 2.1. Consider a game of T = 1 period with two firms and n > 2 workers
where a proportion p ∈ (0, 1) of workers are fair as defined above. If p < .55, there
exist no PBE where the firm offers more than (5, 1) and workers perform e > 1. If
.55 ≤ p < .6, there exist a PBE where fair workers perform e = 2 and selfish workers
perform e = 1. If .6 ≤ p < .65, there exist a PBE where fair workers perform 3 ≤ e ≤ 8
and selfish workers perform e = 1. If p ≥ .65, there exist a PBE where fair workers
perform e > 8 and selfish workers perform e = 1.
We now consider a multi period model. All the variable are indexed with t to denote
the period. Since all offers will be fair in equilibrium and fair workers will always deliver
the requested effort of a fair offer, we only need to consider the shirking behavior of selfish
workers. Let Vt+1 be the expected future utility of not shirking at period t and Ut+1 be
the expected future utility of shirking at t. The selfish type will shirk if future job rents,
defined as Vt+1−Ut+1, are not larger than current cost of delivering the requested effort.
Vt+1 − Ut+1 > c(e˜t) (1)
Proposition 2.2. Consider a game of T > 1 periods with two firms and n > 2 workers
where p = .6 are fair as in Definition 1. The following strategies and beliefs constitute a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which both worker types perform maximum effort in all
non final period t < T :
• At t = 1 all firms make public offers with the identical payoff splitting contract
[59, 10].
• A firm offers to his previous worker a contract of [59, 10] in all periods 1 < t < T
and [46, 8] in period T if the worker performed the demanded effort in all previous
periods. If the worker ever shirked, the firm privately offers the contract to a never
employed worker. If all workers have shirked, firm makes public offers of [5, 1] in
all future periods.
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• In period 1, two workers accept the two public offers and perform the desired effort
et = 10 (whether they are selfish or fair). At period T a selfish worker performs
eT = 1 while a fair worker performs eT = 8. Pairing happens at the first period
and continues throughout; n− 2 workers remain unemployed for all t.
• Out of equilibrium beliefs: a firm believes that if a worker ever shirks he is selfish.
We now consider downturns. Let µ be the probability of receiving employment offers
from someone other than the current firm. The value of µ depend on contracting norms:
for example, if all firms that went into downturn make new offers upon returning, then
µ = δ. If firms only make private offers to their previous trading partner, then µ = 0. It
is also possible that some firms are unmatched in period t > 1, either because they are
hit by a downturn before forming relationships, or because their offers upon returning
are rejected, thus requiring public offers. Here 0 < µ < δ.4
Let V δt+1 be the expected future utility of not shirking at period t and U
δ
t+1 be the
expected future utility of shirking at t when firms go into a downturn with probabilty
δ. Suppose firms attempt to reconnect with workers that did not shirk after a downturn
but some firms remain unmatched at period t > 1 (µ > 0). Let jt be the shorthand for
wˆ(e˜t)− c(e˜t).
V δt = (1− δ)(jt + V δt+1) + δ[µ(jt + V δt+1) + (1− µ)(5 + jt+1 + V δt+2)] (2)
With probability 1 − δ the firm does not go into downturn and the pair continues their
relationship. With probability δ firm goes into a downturn. When this happens, with
probability µ agent accepts a public offer from another firm, and with probability 1− µ
agent is unemployed at period t and returns to the incumbent firm when he returns from
the downturn.
Let U δt+1 be the expected future utility of shirking at t when firms go into downturn
with probabili ty δ.
U δt = µ(jt + V
δ
t+1) + (1− µ)(5 + U δt+1) (3)
With probability µ agent accepts a public offer from another firm, and with probabil-
ity 1−µ agent is unemployed at period t and faces period t+1 with the same uncertainty.
Proposition 2.3. For δ > 0 and µ ≥ 0
(i) job rents are positive V δt − U δt > 0 ∀t ≤ T for all eT > 1
(ii) stochastic interruptions lower job rents
Vt − Ut > V δt − U δt ∀t ≤ T
Since job rents are lower in downturn, the incentive constraint in Eq.1 binds more
frequently. For example, suppose (1 − µ)(1 − δ) = 0.5. The second to last period
4µ may also depend on subjective beliefs (optimism).
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effort level that can be sustained given e˜T = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10} has now decreased
to e˜T−1 = {1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 10, 10} (where each from vector entry correspond to the
same sequenced value e˜T ) from {1, 5, 7, 9, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10} when there is no downturn.
Notice that given the same marginal cost of effort (e.g c′(e) = 2), higher effort levels are
affected less than in the downturn (for eT = {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, the reduction in eT−1 due to
downturn is {3, 3, 3, 2, 1, 0}).
The next proposition shows that an equilibrium exists where workers and firms have
strong loyalty norms.
Proposition 2.4. Consider a game of T > 1 periods where a firm can be hit by a
downturn at any period with probability δ < 0.5.5 There are two firms and n > 2 workers
where p = .6 are fair as defined above. The following strategies and beliefs constitutes a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which both worker types perform maximum effort in all
non final periods t < T :
• At t = 1 all firms that are not in downturn make public offer of [59, 10].
• If a firm is in a downturn at t = 1, when returning it makes a private offer to a
never employed worker of [59, 10]. If there are no workers that are never employed,
firm makes a public offer of [5, 1].
• A firm offers to his previous worker a contract of [59, 10] in all periods 1 < t < T
and [46, 8] in period T if the worker performed the demanded effort in all previous
periods. If the worker ever shirked, the firm privately offers the contract to a pre-
viously unmatched worker. If all workers have shirked, firm makes public offers of
[5, 1] in all future periods.
• When a firm returns from a downturn, it makes a private offer to the previous
worker if he has not shirked.
• Workers accept all offers and performed the desired amount et = 10 at t < T .
Workers choose the incumbent firm when they receive identical competing offers.
• Out of equilibrium belief: a firm believes that if a worker ever shirks he is selfish.
• In period 1, two workers accept the two public offers and perform the desired effort
et = 10 if he is selfish or fair. At period T a selfish worker performs eT = 1 while
a fair worker performs eT = 8. Pairing happens at the first period and remain
throughout; n− 2 workers remain unemployed for all t.
Stochastic interruptions reduce job rents, however, if the equilibrium wage /effort
package provides high enough profit (jT ) and reconnection norms are adequately strong,
relationships and quality of contracts will survive downturns. Lower equilibrium wage/effort
5Except when a firm has just returned from the downturn. A firm cannot be hit by two consecutive
downturns.
7
will be more affected by the discounting caused by the stochastic interruptions, and lower
reconnection norms (large µ) will further reduce the job rents (Vt−Ut), thus making the
incentive constraint binds more frequently and reducing the quality of contracts that can
be sustained in equilibrium.
Our experimental investigation will focus on the following questions: first, are job
rents actually lower in downturns? If so, do lower rents lower wages and effort? What
sort of loyalty norms exist between firms and workers and how do these norms affect
contracts?
3 Experiment
Many experiments have been done in the basic “gift exchange” paradigm (see Camerer
and Weber (2008), Fehr and Gchter (2000)). The general finding is that wages and efforts
are persistently above the minimum level.6 The general interpretation of these effects
is that many workers feel a sense of positive reciprocity toward firms that pay generous
wages. However, there is also typically a noticeable drop in effort in the last period,
which is a reminder that some workers are purely self-interested and will shirk when
reputational concerns are absent.
BFF1 ran their experiments with 7 firms and 10 workers. They found that when effort
is non-contractible and firms can make private offers (using worker IDs and privately-
known effort history), about half of the total trades take place in relationships that last
at least half of the total number of trading periods. Effort becomes a function of wage
and private offer and the length of the relationship.
In their experiments “two-tiered” labor markets emerge reliably. Long term rela-
tionships conform to the theoretical prediction above and are characterized by repeated
private offers, high wages, and high (costly) effort. The longer the previous length of re-
lationship and the more positive the effort surprise is,7 the more likely it is that a private
contract will be repeated. On the other hand short term relations also exist in which
contracts are mostly initiated through public offers with low offered wages and delivered
efforts are low. Some of these results are detailed below in Section 4.1 and compared to
our baseline replications of their design.
We ran two types of experimental sessions: baseline sessions replicating the structure
of BFF1 with 9 firms and downturn sessions in which there are commonly-known prob-
6When the total surplus from higher effort is smaller, efforts are lower too. Some experiments have
shown boundary conditions under which wages and efforts are not very much higher than the minimum
(e.g., Rigdon (2002)). Note, however, that in all cases (including the latter) when efforts are regressed
against prepaid wages there is a strong, significant correlation.
7Surprise is defined in BFF1 as the difference between delivered effort and expected effort, which is
elicited from firms after the workers have accepted the contract but before effort is revealed. We will
use the same definition here.
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Location Treatment Firms Workers Periods Number of sessions
Caltech Baseline 9 10 30 2
Downturn p = 0.05 8 9 30 1
Downturn p = 0.05 9 10 30 1
Downturn p = 0.1 9 10 30 1
UCLA Baseline 9 10 30 2
Downturn p = 0.1 9 10 30 2
Table 2: Experimental treatments (Caltech and UCLA)
ability (.05 or .10) of a firm-specific downturn which lasts 3 periods. The experiments
were run in Spring 2008. Table 2 shows the treatments and subject pools in all sessions.8
Our session features were modified step-by-step to pursue what we thought were the
most interesting variations. We first explore a labor market where in every period firms
face a downturn probability of .05. This did not produce enough downturns to give sta-
tistical power so we increased the downturn probability to .10. We explored subject pool
heterogeneity by running sessions at both California Institute of Technology (Caltech)
and University of California in Los Angeles (UCLA). The subject pool at Caltech is
small, often unusually cooperative, and have substantial experience with laboratory ex-
periments, while UCLA subjects resemble the typical large-university group more closely.
4 Results
Our analysis is summarized in four results. Section 4.1 shows the replication of baseline
markets in UCLA and Caltech. In Section 4.2 we present the impact of downturns on job
rents and contracting: even though job rents are lower, market efficiency is unharmed. We
investigate the reason for this robustness in the last two sections. Section 4.3 shows that
temporary market (short term relationships) actually improves with downturn threats.
Ironically, this is because firms demand more out of public workers before renewing
relationships, thus delaying the separation of the two tiers of the market and shortening
relationships. The improvement in wages and effort in the temporary market increases
the reservation value of workers, which induces firms desiring relationships to raise wages
in order to achieve adequate separation. However, Section 4.4 shows that firms and
workers who are sharing their surplus 50-50 remain unaffected. These pairs have strong
loyalty norms that allow them to reconnect after downturns. Reconnection is fairly
sharply predicted by whether firms offer surplus shares around 50% .
8Two pilot baseline session with 15 periods were ran in January 2008. These pilot sessions replicated
the BFF1 results.
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4.1 Replication of Baseline Result in Two Subject Pools
Our experiments replicate the basic patterns of contracting, wages and effort in BFF1
quite closely using two different subject pools and extending number of contracting pe-
riods from 15 to 30 (see Figure 1). The efficiency of the UCLA market is lower than
that of the Caltech sessions which is slightly higher than the BFF averages. Wage, effort,
private offers, and relationship length are remarkably consistent.
The top left panel of Figure 1 shows the pattern of wages for accepted offers. Average
contracted wages are increasing as a function of time. Qualitative and quantitatively,
wages are very similar in BFF1’s sessions and our baseline replications. The average plots
mask a lot of cross-firm variability however. Many private offers are made persistently
around a wage of 60, while public offers are lower, around 20.
The top right panel shows the pattern of worker efforts. Average delivered effort
increases in time with a last period effect. There is upward movement across the time
with a last period effect; the effort levels are similar across BFF1’s sessions and both of
ours. The bottom left panel shows the percentage of offers that are private (i.e., which
earmark an offer for a particular ID-numbered worker). That percentage starts off at
about 30% and moves upward to around 80% before levelling off. Private relational
contracting clearly comes to dominate in all subject pools.
One useful statistic is the average job tenure, summarized by the distribution of the
fraction of total periods in which a firm hires the same worker. (Note that these do not
have to be continuous runs of identical hiring). The bottom right panel of Figure 1 shows
the cumulative distribution of this statistic. There are more short term relationships in
BFF1; about 1/3 of trades in BFF1 take place between partners that interacted 1/10th of
the time (1 to 2 periods) while in LC (Linardi-Camerer) sessions only 1/6 of total trades
fall within this category. In contrast, about 1/3 of the matches in our replications last
through more than 90% of the session (27-30 periods); this number is much smaller in
BFF1. Except for these modest differences in extreme short and long matching, however,
the typical job tenures are not far apart. The differences are likely due at least in part to
the fact that longer relationships can develop over 30 periods (LC) than over 15 periods
(BFF).
Surplus sharing and the relation between profits and relationship length are similar in
BFF1’s sessions and our sessions (see Figure 4 in the Appendix). Surplus sharing in very
short relationships (temp market) is filled with shirking, which benefits workers. Then
in the entry level of the high tier relationship, the workers pay their dues in higer effort
to gain trust of the firm, sacrificing their surplus. As the relationship grows, the surplus
sharing becomes more equal, eventually reaching approximately 50-50 for the longest
relationships. Earnings per trade for both firms and workers rise with relationship length
in both sessions.
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Figure 1a shows the pattern of wages for accepted offers. Average wages are very similar in 
BFF1’s sessions and our baseline replications. The average plots mask a lot of cross-firm variability 
however. Many private offers are made persistently around a wage of 60, while public offers are lower, 
around 20.  
 Figure 1b shows the pattern of worker efforts. There is upward movement across the time and the 
efforts are similar across BFF1’s sessions and both of ours. 
Figure 1c shows the percentage of offers that are private (i.e., which earmark an offer for a 
particular ID-numbered worker). That percentage starts off at about 1/3 and moves upward to around 80% 
before levelling off. Private relational contracting clearly comes to dominate in all subject pools. 
One useful statistic is the average job tenure, summarized by the distribution of the fraction of total 
periods in which a firm hires the same worker. (Note that these do not have to be continuous runs of 
identical hiring).  Figure 1d shows the cumulative distribution of this statistic. There is more short term 
relationships in BFF1;  about 1/3 of trades in BFF1 takes place between partners that interacted 1/10th of 
the time (1 to 2 periods) while in LC (Linardi-Camerer) sessions only 1/6 of total trades fall within this 
category. In contrast, about 1/3 of the matches in our replications last through more than 9/10th of the 
session(27-30 periods); this number is much smaller in BFF1. Except for these modest differences in 
extreme short and long matching, however, the typical job tenures are not far apart.  
Surplus sharing and the relation between profits and relationship length are similar in BFF1’s 
sessions and our sessions (see Figure 1 in the Appendix).  Surplus sharing in very short relationship (temp 
market) is filled with shirking, hence benefits workers. Then in entry level of the high tier relationship, the 
workers put in their dues to gain trust of the firm, sacrificing their share. As the relationship grows, the 
Figure 1: Patterns of relational contracting in BFF (gray) r plicated at Caltech (dark
blue) and UCLA (light red).
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surplus sharing becomes more equal eventually reaching approximately 50-50 for the longest relationships.  
Earnings per trade for both firms and workers rise with relationship length in both sessions.  
 
4.2: Impact of downturn on job rents and contracting 
 
 The key mechanism in the argument of sustaining a high equilibrium in finitely repeated 
contracting is the existence of positive rent for workers in the final period. This rent exists if there is 
difference in earnings between workers with a job and those without one. This rent makes it optimal for 
workers to not shirk in earlier period, which makes it profitable for firms to offer high wages. We predict 
that when stochastic interruptions happen, job rents are lower because workers that are employed may be 
unemployed in the future and those who are unemployed might be reemployed in the future, either by their 
previous partner or by someone else.  
We computed the average of all present and future incomes of all those workers trading in period 
t.  The average value of a job in period t (denoted Vte) is calculated from total current and future7 income 
of workers employed in period t. In addition, the average value of being without a job in period t (Vtu)  is 
the average future income of a worker who is unemployed in period t. 8Generally, Vte and Vtu are 
declining in t since there are fewer periods remaining. In a spot market where there are no relational 
contracts and workers freely move from firm to firm, Vte and Vtu will be similar. In a highly relational 
market with excess labor supply, in which all workers form long-term attachments, there will be a large 
separation between Vte and Vtu which represents the cumulative job rent from having a relational contract. 
BFF finds large and positive job rents in all 15 periods.  
 
Figure 2: Job rents in Baseline (Solid black) compared to Downturn (dotted black) and BFF (gray, 15 
periods). 2.a Future earnings of workers employed in period t (Vte), 2.b Future earnings of workers 
unemployed in period t (Vtu).  2.c Job rents are higher in baseline (Vte-Vtu).  
 
 
 
 
 
The computation is illustrated in Figure 2. Figure 2a shows that Vte is higher in the baseline 
market (solid) compared to the downturn market (dotted). Figure 2b shows that Vtu is lower in the baseline 
market (solid) compared to the downturn market (dotted), but the difference in not great.  Figure 2c shows 
that as predicted, job rents is lower in downturn almost throughout the entire period. However, rents are 
always large and positive in all markets. As comparison, we rescale BFF’s job rents by two to take into 
                                                 
7 Sum of income from period t to final period T (15 in BFF and 30 in LC). 
8 Note that it is difficult to define Ute for downturns since the future job rent of someone in a long term relationship 
who is temporarily unemployed due to a downturn is included. A better option may be to compute the    
Figure 2: Job rents in Baseline (solid) is higher than Downturn (dotted) at both Caltech
(L) and UCLA (R).
4.2 Impact of Downturn on Job Rents and Contracting
The key mechanism in the argument for sustaining a high equilibrium in finitely repeated
contracting is the existence of positive rent for workers in the final period. This rent
exists if there i ifference in earnings between workers with a job and those with ut one.
This rent akes it optimal for w rkers to ot shirk in earlier periods, whi h makes it
profitable for firms to offer high wages (as in efficiency wage theory). We predict that
when stochastic interruptions can happen, job rents are lower because workers that are
employed may be unemployed in the future. We computed the average of all present and
future incomes of all workers trading in period t. The average value of a job in period
t (denoted Vt) is calculated from total current and future income of workers employed
in period t. The average value of being without a job in period t (Ut) is the average
future income of a worker who is unemployed in period t.9 Generally, Vte and Ut are
declining in t since there are fewer periods remaining. In a spot market where there
are no relational contracts and workers freely move from firm to firm, Vt and Ut will
be similar. In a highly relational market with excess labor supply, in which all workers
form long-term attachments, there will be a large separation between Vt and Ut which
represents the cumulative job rent from having a relational contract. BFF finds large
and positive job rents in all 15 periods.
Figure 2 compares job rents in Baseline (Solid black)to Downturn (dotted black)
and BFF (gray, 15 periods). As predicted, job rents (Vt-Ut) are lower in the downturn
treatments almost throughout the entire period. Rents are always large and positive in
all markets (as comparison, we rescale BFF’s job rents by two to take into account the
9This includes both matched workers who are left unemployed when their firms go into downturn
and those who have been unmatched all along. We will look at the matched workers more carefully in
Section 4.4.
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difference in the number of periods in our experiment). The evolution of job rents across
the three markets show remarkable similarities: the downturn job rents seem to be a
lower, lagged version of the baseline job rents.
Consistent with the lower job rents, relationship lengths are also slightly shorter -
trading parties in downturns have on average interacted two periods less than in the
baseline (Table 3 Row 9). There is a 13% increase in trade taking place in relationship
of length 4 or shorter (there’s a 6% increase in one-shot contracts alone). Row 12 shows
that in the downturn 5% fewer contracts led to renewal compared to baseline. To take
account of the differences in total trading periods introduced by the downturns, we define
(firm) ARL (adjusted relationship length) as the number of trades between two partners
divided by the total number of period the firm has been active. An ARL of 1 means that
the firm has traded only with this partner. ARL in downturns are 6% shorter than in
baseline (Row 10). These shorter relationships meant more pairings: 52% of all possible
matches in the downturn markets actually occur, compared to 47% in baseline markets.10
Does this imply that the wages and effort levels that can be sustained in the downturn
market are lower? Suprisingly, the answer is no. Table 3 shows that offered wages are
actually significantly higher (Row 1) and so are contracted wages (Row 5). Effort level
remains the same (Row 11) at around 7.5, resulting in a small shift of surplus sharing
towards workers in the downturn treatment (Row 3). Figure 5 in the Appendix plots the
patterns of contracting (wages, effort, private offers, and relationship lengths) against
time in the baseline and downturn markets.
4.3 Slow Separation Leads to Higher Prices
The instability from the downturn market creates smaller job rents and shorter relation-
ships. Since the size of job rents determines the severity of the threat of unemployment
and relationship lengths are positively correlated with high wages, this makes the higher
average wage in the downturn sessions even more of a puzzle.
Plotting the average public and private wages offers separately against periods (Figure
3), we see that in the downturn market (dotted line), there is little separation between
the two tiers of the market (public and private) until the second half. In the baseline
market (solid lines), the two tiers separated early. Private offers in the first half of the
downturn are only 3.35 (std.dev. 1.26) higher than public offers. But private offers in
the first half of baseline are 12.16 (1.29) higher than over public contracts.
There is a striking difference in the quality of the short term market in the downturn
treatment compared to the baseline. The average downturn wage offer is 29.75 (dotted
line with white marker), compared to 18.59 (solid line with black marker) in baseline.
The difference is significant at p < 0.01. The improvement in offers resulted in a much
10Note that when there are 9 firms and 10 workers, 90 distinct firm-worker matches are possible in
each experimental session.
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account the difference in the number of periods in our experiment.  The evolution of job rents across the 
three markets show remarkable similarites: the downturn job rents seems to be a smaller, lagged version 
of the baseline job rents.  
Consistent with the lower job rents, relationship lengths are also slightly shorter – trading parties in 
downturns have on average interacted two periods less than in the baseline (Table 2 Row 9). There is a 
13% increase in trade taking place in relationship of length 4 or shorter (there’s a 6% increase in 1 shot 
contracts alone). Row 12 shows that in the downturn 5% fewer contracts led to renewal compared to 
baseline.  To take account of the differences in total trading periods introduced by the downturns, we 
define (firm) a.r.l (adjusted relationship length) as the number of trades between two partners divided by 
the total number of period the firm has been active. An a.r.l of 1 means that the firm has traded only with 
this partner. A.r.l in downturns are 6% shorter than in baseline (Row 10).  These shorter relationships 
meant more pairings:  52% of all possible matches in the downturn markets actually occur, compared to 
47% in baseline markets.9
Does this imply that the wages and effort levels that can be sustained in the downturn market are 
lower? Suprisingly, the answer is no. Table 2 shows that offered wages are actually significantly higher 
(Row 1) and so are contracted wages (Row 5). Effort level remains the same (Row 11) at around 7.5, 
resulting in a shift of surplus sharing towards workers (Row 3).  Figure 2 in the Appendix plots the patterns 
of contracting (wages, effort, private offers, and relationship lengths) against time in the baseline and 
downturn markets.  
 
Table 2: Summary statistics effect of downturn.  
 Caltech UCLA  
 diffe diffSE diff diffSE 
Offers:     
1.Wage 3.70 0.80 2.04 0.98 
2.Desired Effort 0.43 0.09 0.39 0.14 
3.Worker/Total Surplus 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 
4.Fraction Private 0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.02 
Accepted Offers     
5.Wage 2.21 0.81 -1.70 1.28 
6.Desired Effort 0.22 0.09 -0.52 0.16 
7.Worker/Total Surplus -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.01 
8.Fraction Private -0.02 0.02 -0.06 0.03 
9.Relationship Length -2.25 0.43 -2.54 0.43 
10.A.r.l -0.07 0.02 -0.08 0.02 
Actual     
11.Delivered Effort 0.04 0.14 -0.30 0.20 
12.Effort Surprise 0.13 0.09 0.00 0.12 
13.Buyer Profit -1.85 0.91 -1.35 1.26 
14.Seller Profit 2.28 0.58 -0.77 0.96 
15.Worker/Total Surplus 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 
16.Renewed Immediately -0.01 0.03 -0.14 0.03 
 
Note: 
Surprise = Expected Effort(not reported) – Delivered effort 
A(djusted).r(elationship).l(ength) = Previous trades/Number of active trading period 
 
4.3: Slow separation leads to higher prices 
 
                                                 
9 Note that when there are 9 firms and 10 workers, 90 distinct firm-worker matches are possible in each experimental 
session. 
Table 3: Summary statistics of the effect of downturn.
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The instability from the downturn market brought on smaller job rents and shorter relationships. 
Since the size of job rents determines the severity of the threat of unemployment and relationships lengths 
are positively correlated with high wages, this makes the higher equilibrium wage even more of a puzzle.  
Plotting the average public and private wages offers separately against time (Figure 3), we see an 
interesting pattern.The first thing to notice is that in the downturn market, there is little separation between 
the two tiers of the market until the second half. In the baseline market (solid lines), public (solid circles 
marker) and private offers (line with no market) separated early. The downturn market (dotted lines) does 
not separate until the second half: private offers in the first half of the downturn pays 3.35(1.26) higher 
than public offers. Private offers in the first half of baseline commands a 12.16 (1.29) premium over public 
contracts.  
There is a striking increase in the quality of the short term market. The average downturn wage 
offer is 29.75 (dotted line with white marker), compared to 18.59 (solid line with black marker) in baseline. 
The difference is significant at p<0.01. The improvement in offers resulted in a much higher contracted 
wage/effort level for the second half. For the downturn market the average second half wage is 
27.8,sustaining average effort level of 4.3. baseline wage in the 2nd half of the 30 period contracting is 9.3, 
sustaining average effort of 2.  (p<0.01) 
 
Figure 3 Average wages: Left Caltech, Right UCLA 
 
 
 
 
Determinants of wage, acceptance, effort, and renewal. We first look only at the first period 
because each period affects the following period. Similar to that of BFF, the strongest drivers of wages are 
requested effort. This wage effect has been found, strongly, in every lab experimental study of this type 
(see Camerer and Weber, 2008). Private offers in baseline provide the workers with a bonus, but in 
downturns comes with a premium charge for the workers . Offers with higher surplus sharing are accepted 
more readily: higher wages and lower desired efforts. Effort is a function of increase in wage and 
requested effort. A contract renewal occurs when a firm makes a private offer to the employee hired in the 
previous period. In downturns firms are less likely to renew contracts. As we have seen before, the level of 
relational contracting in UCLA is slightly lower: equilibrium wages and effort is lower in UCLA and renewals 
are also lower. 
Figure 3: Stochastic noise delays separation of the two tiers of the labor market in Caltech
(L) and UCLA (R).
higher contracted wage/effort level for the second half as well. For the downturn market
the averag s c nd half wage is 27.8, sustaining av rage effort level of 4.3. T e baseline
wage in the second half is a much lower 9.3, sustaining low average effort of 2. (p < 0.01)
We now focus on the determinants of wage, acceptance, effort, and renewal. In Table
4 first look only at the first period because each period affects the following period.
Similar to the results of BFF, the strongest driver of wage is requested effort. Private
offers in baseline provide the workers with a bonus, but in downturns comes with a
premium charge for the workers. Offers with higher surplus sharing are accepted more
readily: higher wages and lower desired efforts. Effort is a function of increase in wage
and requested effort. This effort response to wages has been found, strongly, in every lab
experimental study of this type (see Camerer and Weber, 2008).
A contract renewal occurs when a firm makes a private offer to the employee hired in
the previous period. In downturns firms are less likely to renew contracts. As we have
seen before, the level of relational contracting in UCLA is slightly lower: equilibrium
wages and effort are lower in UCLA and renewals are also lower.
Table 5 includes all 30 periods with controls for each period, relationship length, and
last period effect. As play continues, relationship length becomes increasingly important:
it increases wages offered, rate of acceptance, and contract renewals. The private offer
bonus continues to be missing in the downturn. Because stable relationships are relatively
harder to come by for workers in downturn, the workers are willing to reward long term
firms more: long term offers are even more likely to be accepted and rewarded with
high effort in downturn. Firms’ unwillingness to renew contracts gradually lessened
as periods go on, the coefficient in the contract renewal for downturns continue to be
negative, but is no longer significant. Other factors such as whether the delivered effort
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Table 3. Initial determinants of Firm and Seller behavior (t=1) 
 
  OLS: Wage Offer 
Logit: 
Acceptance OLS: Effort Logit: Renewal 
  Coef   S.E Coef   S.E Coef   S.E Coef   S.E 
Intercept -6.13   7.40 3.02 * 1.63 0.73   1.12 1.63   1.41
Wage       0.07 ** 0.03 0.07 ** 0.03       
Surprise                  0.25   0.22
Desired Effort 4.84 *** 0.87 -0.52 ** 0.22 0.45 ** 0.20       
Actual Effort                  -0.12   0.18
Private 6.43 * 3.34 -2.66 *** 0.65 0.62   0.74 0.86   0.91
UCLA -5.38 ** 2.29 -0.14   0.39 -1.19 ** 0.48 -1.27 * 0.67
Downturn 11.36   10.21 -1.73   2.01 0.42   1.65 -6.53 *** 2.46
Downturn*Wages       -0.02   0.03 0.00   0.04       
Downturn*Surprise                  0.08   0.40
Downturn*DesEffort -1.15   1.30 0.25   0.29 -0.08   0.27       
Downturn* Ac.Effort                  0.68 ** 0.32
Downturn*Private -10.37 ** 4.71 0.64   0.84 -0.76   0.99 2.00   1.56
                          
N 186     186   71    71    
Adjusted R2 0.29     0.40     0.56     0.43     
***p=<1%, **p<5%, * p<10% 
Table 4: Initial (t = 1) determinants of firm and worker behavior.
Note: Firms in the Downturn treatment start out with lower private wages (-10.37) and
are less likely to renew private offers (-6.53). This suggests that firms are being choosy
about their private contracting partner under the threat of stochastic interruptions.
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Table 4. Determinants of Firm and Seller behavior, all periods 
 
  
OLS: Wage 
Offered Logit: Acceptance Ols: Effort Logit: Renewal 
  Coef   S.E Coef   S.E Coef   S.E Coef   S.E 
Intercept -16.38 *** 2.67 -1.90 *** 0.48 -0.08   0.38 -3.97 *** 0.46
Wage        0.05 *** 0.01 0.10 *** 0.02      
Surprise                0.39 *** 0.09
Desired Effort 4.45 *** 0.34 -0.06   0.06 0.28 *** 0.08      
Actual Effort                  0.13 *** 0.05
A.r.l 18.42 *** 2.17 6.58 *** 0.71 0.33   0.36 3.44 *** 0.42
Private 11.59 *** 2.18 -2.57 *** 0.36 0.94 *** 0.26 2.01 *** 0.37
Period 0.05   0.07 0.08 *** 0.01 0.00   0.01 0.03 ** 0.01
lastPeriod -0.93   1.08 -0.98 *** 0.19 -2.18 *** 0.37 -14.20 *** 0.69
UCLA -3.32   1.61 0.73 *** 0.27 -0.49 *** 0.14 0.28   0.26
Downturn 7.97 ** 3.92 1.49 ** 0.60 0.44   0.55 -1.03   0.86
Downturn:Wage       0.00   0.01 -0.02   0.03      
Downturn:suprise                -0.11   0.19
Downturn:DesiredEffort -0.09   0.52 -0.15 * 0.08 -0.03   0.15      
Downturn:ActualEffort                  0.17   0.10
Downturn:A.r.l -0.21   3.13 1.12 ** 0.55 1.08 * 0.61 -0.74   0.68
Downturn:Private -8.61 *** 2.97 -0.05   0.29 0.18   0.35 0.13   0.58
Downturn:Period 0.13   0.11 0.01   0.01 0.01   0.01 -0.01   0.02
                       
N 3435     3434   2091    2091    
adj R2 0.72     0.64     0.77     0.60     
***p=<1%, **p<5%, * p<10%            
 
Robust standard error. For wage offered and contract renewal, standard error is clustered on firms. For acceptance and effort, 
standard error is clustered on workers. 
  
Table 4 includes all 30 period with controls for each period, relationship length, and last period 
effect.10  As play continues, relationship length began to be important: it increases wages offered, rate of 
acceptance, and contract renewals. The private offer bonus continues to be lacking in the downturn. 
Because stable relationships are relatively harder to come by for workers in downturn, the workers are 
willing to reward long term firms more: long term offers are even more likely to be accepted and rewarded 
with high effort in downturn. Firms’ unwillingness to renew contracts gradually lessened as periods goes 
on, the coefficient in the contract renewal for downturns continue to be negative, but is no longer 
significant. Other factors such as whether the delivered effort level meets expectation (surprises), 
relationship lengths, and whether the contract was private becomes more important.  
 
Overall the result suggests that in a finitely repeated game, delay in forming relationships have 
long lasting repercussions. Firms in downturn correctly anticipated that with fewer firms active, workers 
experience higher competition for jobs. However, firms reacted by demanding more from a worker before 
extending long term relationships. First, they offer lower surplus sharing in private offers. For the earliest 
five periods, private offers in downturns are actually less fair than public offers (average private offer prices 
is 30.5 with a surplus of 0.22 compared to public offers of 29.2 with surplus share of 0.29). This is the 
opposite of the situation in baseline, where average private offer prices of 34 (and surplus sharing of 0.23) 
serves as a bonus for the worker whose outside option are public offers of24 (with surplus sharing of 0.18).  
Since fair surplus offers are accepted more frequently, private contracts constitutes a significantly smaller 
                                                 
10 Should this be moved to the appendix? 
Table 5: Determinants of firm and worker behavior, pooled across all periods.
Note: Firms in the Downturn treatment continues to lower private wages (-8.61) but are
no longer reluctant to renew private ffers as the period progresses.
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level meets expectation (surprises), relationship lengths, and whether the contract was
private become more important.
Overall the result suggests that in a finitely repeated game, delay in forming relation-
ships have long lasting repercussions. Firms in downturn correctly anticipated that with
fewer firms active, workers experience higher competition for jobs. However, firms re-
acted by demanding more from a worker before extending long term relationships. First,
they offer lower surplus sharing in private offers. For the earliest five periods, private
offers in downturns are actually less fair than public offers (average private offer price is
30.5 with a surplus of 0.22 compared to public offers of 29.2 with surplus share of 0.29).
This is the opposite of the situation in baseline, where average private offer prices of 34
(and surplus sharing of 0.23) serve as a bonus for the worker whose outside options are
public offers of 24 (with surplus sharing of 0.18). Since fair surplus offers are accepted
more frequently, private contracts constitute a significantly smaller fraction of total con-
tracting in downturn market (42.5% in downturn) than in baseline (51.5% in baseline).
This difference is significant at p < .10 with a one sided t-test).
The difference in surplus offered leads to further delay in relationship formation.
Public offers are renewed less frequently than private offers. In addition, since public
offers are more fair in downturn, workers’ effort matches firms’ expectations much more
closely in downturns. Because public offers in downturn carry little penalty in terms
of lower profits for both parties or suprises to firms,11 there is little incentive for both
partners to move away from public offers. Average rate of renewals in the first 5 periods
of downturn is 41%, compared to 49% in baseline.
Even though these early period behaviors (such as penalty for private offers and firms’
unwillingness to renew) decrease in time,12 the effects lingered. In fact, aggregating
across all periods, the difference in workers’ earnings in a public offer (24.6) and a new
private offer (26.9) is not statistically significant (p = 0.12). This is starkly different from
baseline, where the average seller earnings from public offers is 16.9 and from new private
offers is 23.85 (p < 0.01).13 As a result, private contracts in downturn are conducted
within a shorter relationship: average ARL of private contracts in downturn are 8%
(0.01) shorter than in baseline while average ARL of public contracts in downturns are
1% (0.03) longer than in baseline.14 Firms’ unwillingness to commit in the early periods
of downturn sessions ironically results in higher reservation prices for workers and loss of
bargaining power due to shorter relationships, which requires the firm to pay much more
in later periods for the same level of effort.
11Firms’ average surprise from public offers is -1.36 (0.22) in the baseline and -0.31 (0.18). Baseline
public contract suprises is significantly more negative (p < 0.01).
12Table 3 Row 3, Private contracts make up 81% of total contracts in baseline vs 78% in downturns
13For firms, the difference between public offer earnings and new private offer earnings is 19.8 vs 24.6
in downturn (p < 0.05), and 18.3 vs 28 in baseline (p < 0.01).
14The fact that the difference in ARL (adjusted relationship length) of private contracts is higher (-
8%) than that of total contracting (-6%) suggests that as firms use private offers renewals less, repeated
interactions are partially driven by workers who sought after public offers from their previous firms.
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4.4 50-50 Surplus Sharing and Loyalty Norms
In the previous section we see that stochastic interruption slows down the formation of
long term private contracting. In this section we ask whether downturn affects established
relationships by looking more closely at the periods surrounding downturns.
There were 79 instances of downturns. Among them, there were 70 instances where
firms have the opportunity to reconnect with the workers they have previously traded
with. In the period before the downturn in these 70 cases, average wage contracted was
41.81 with average desired effort level of 7.9 (this implied an offered worker surplus share
of 0.39). Workers provide an average effort level of 7. (See Table 10 in the Appendix).
When downturn prevents firms from hiring, these “laid-off” workers go to a lower quality
(short term) market where contracts are lower in wage and surplus sharing (Table 10
Column 2).
Two-thirds of the total 118 interim trades came from private offers. Those workers
that have received many private offers in the past or have longer relationship lengths
are more likely to get new private offers during this period (Table 6 Model 1). Workers
simply grabbed whatever offers they got (Table 6 Model 2) - the primary determinant of
their activity is the number of private offers they receive. Workers treat these contracts
with the same norm of fairness as they had with their previous employers, delivering
effort that ensure themselves 0.68 of the total surplus.
Firms try to squeeze a little bit upon return from the downturn (lowering surplus
offers from 0.39 to 0.35) (Table 10 Column 3). Of the 70 firms returning from downturn,
40 tried to reconnect with previous workers. Reconnection attempts depend mostly on
previously delivered effort and relationship length (Table 6 Model 3). The 30 other firms
attempted to hire other workers (14) or made public offers (16).15 Six reconnection at-
tempts were rebuffed by workers, and two public offers were grabbed by previous workers,
thus restarting the previous relationship. The overall reconnection rate was 54%.
Table 6 Model 3 and 4 model the empirical reconnection norms.16 Firm attempted is 1
if the firm made a private offer to its previous employee. Pair reconnected is 1 if the firm
made such an offer and it was accepted. More interim job searches lower the chance that
firms attempt to reconnect and that workers accept reconnection offers, which supports
our model of strong reconnection norms.17
There is a very striking effect of pre-downturn surplus sharing on successful recon-
15The public offers made by returning firms are often more generous in surplus sharing than average
public offers (the mean returning firms’ public offer is 0.37 as opposed to 0.29), which help keep the high
surplus sharing norms in the downturn public offer.
16Model 1 is an OLS on the number of private offers received by workers left unemployed by downturns.
Model 2 is an OLS on the number of trades these workers engage in. Model 3 is a logit regression on
whether or not firms make a private offer to its previous worker after returning from the downturn.
Model 4 is a logit regression on whether the firm-worker pair reconnected after the downturn.
17Note the sample sizes are low (N=79) because downturns are rare (δ <= 0.1), so strong results are
unlikely to emerge.
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Table 6: Determinants of behavior surrounding downturn. Model 1 is an OLS on the number of 
private offers received by workers left unemployed by downturns. Model 2 is an OLS on the number of 
trades these workers engage in. Model 3 is a logit regression on whether or not firms makes a private offer 
to his previous worker after returning from the downturn. Model 4 is a logit regression on whether the firm-
worker pair reconnected after the downturn. 
 
  
1. OLS: # interim 
private offers 
2. OLS: # of 
interim trades 
3. Logit: firm 
attempt to 
reconnect 
4. Logit: Pair 
reconnected 
  Coef   S.E Coef   S.E Coef   S.E Coef   S.E 
Intercept 1.34 ** 0.53 1.01 *** 0.36 -2.73 * 1.62 -3.92 ** 1.96
Pre downturn variables:                     
Wage -0.02 ** 0.01 0.00   0.01           
Delivered Effort           0.36 *** 0.13 0.30 ** 0.14
Offered Surplus 1.23 * 0.74 -0.25   0.42 -0.44   1.61 4.98 *** 1.88
A.r.l (seller) -0.21   0.63 0.56   0.38           
A.r.l (buyer)            2.70 *** 1.03 2.45 ** 1.09
                        
Number of past private 
offers to seller 0.83 *** 0.25 -0.19 * 0.10 0.21   1.27 0.39   1.40
# interim private offers       0.43 *** 0.07           
# interim trades           -0.55 * 0.33 -0.96 *** 0.38
                       
N 70     70   70    70    
Adjusted R2 0.16     0.35     0.43     0.51     
***p=<1%, **p<5%, * p<10% 
Robust standard error. For interim behavior, standard error are clustered on workers. For post downturn behavior, standard errors 
are clustered on firms.  
 
Table 7: Characteristics of predownturn contracts and postdownturn relationship 
 
  Reconnection 
  
No attempt 
by firm 
Rejected by 
worker 
Accepted 
by worker 
  Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E 
Price 33.92 3.58 37.00 6.35 47.97 2.74
Offered Surplus 0.34 0.03 0.31 0.04 0.43 0.03
Actual Surplus 0.87 0.23 0.38 0.07 0.51 0.03
Relationship Length 2.80 0.54 4.50 1.18 7.89 1.02
  N=30 N=6 N=36 
 
There is a very striking effect of pre-downturn surplus sharing on successful reconnection: Higher 
previous surplus offers have a positive effect on successful reconnection and a negative effect on worker 
rejection of reconnection (i.e., workers tend to reconnect more often if the employer shared more surplus). 
In fact, Table 7 shows that the average predownturn surplus sharing of succesful reconnections is 0.50 – 
the 50-50 split. If the worker share was less than this, firms attempt to reconnect but will be refused by 
workers. If the worker’s share was more than this, firms do not attempt to reconnect. The firms attempt and 
reciprocation from worker also depends on relationship length and wages offered. In conclusion, strong 
loyalty norm can protect relationships against stochastic interruptions: good workers and fair firms 
reconnect after the downturn. 
Table 6: Determinants of firm and worker behavior surrounding downturn.
Table 6 Mod l 3 and 4 odel the reconnection norms.17
 
 “Firm attempted” is 1 if the firm made a 
private offer to its previous employee;and “Pair reconnected” is 1 if the firm made such an offer and it was 
accepted. More interim job search lowers the chance that firms attempt to reconnect, and that workers 
accept reconnection offers, which supports our model of strong reconnection norms. 
Table 6: Determinants of behavior surrounding downturn. Model 1 is an OLS on the number of 
private offers received by workers left unemployed by downturns. Model 2 is an OLS on the number of 
trades these workers engage in. Model 3 is a logit regression on whether or not firms makes a private offer 
to his previous worker after returning from the downturn. Model 4 is a logit regression on whether the firm-
worker pair r connected after the downturn. 
 
  
1. OLS: # 
interim private 
offers 
2. OLS: # of 
interim trades 
3. Logit: firm 
attempt to 
reconnect 
4. Logit: Pair 
reconnected 
  Coef   S.E Coef   S.E Coef   S.E Coef   S.E 
Intercept 1.34 ** 0.53 1.01 *** 0.36 -2.73 * 1.62 -3.92 ** 1.96 
Pre downturn variables:                        
Wage -0.02 ** 0.01 0.00   0.01             
Effort            0.36 *** 0.13 0.30 ** 0.14 
Offered surplus 1.23 * 0.74 -0.25   0.42 -0.44   1.61 4.98 *** 1.88 
Adj.relLen (seller) -0.21   0.63 0.56   0.38             
Adj.relLen (buyer)            2.70 *** 1.03 2.45 ** 1.09 
                         
Sell r's past private 
offers 0.83 *** 0.25 -0.19 * 0.10 0.21   1.27 0.39   1.40 
# interim private offers       0.43 *** 0.07             
# interim trades            -0.55 * 0.33 -0.96 *** 0.38 
                          
N 70     70   70    70    
Adjusted R2 0.16     0.35     0.43     0.51     
Robust standard error. For interim behavior, standard error are clustered on workers. For post downturn behavaior, standard errors 
are clustered on firms.  
 
Table 7: Characteristics of predownturn contracts and postdownturn relationship 
  Reconnection 
  
No attempt 
by firm 
Rejected by 
worker 
Accepted 
by worker 
  Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E 
Price 33.92 3.58 37.00 6.35 47.97 2.74 
Offered Surplus 0.34 0.03 0.31 0.04 0.43 0.03 
Actual Surplus 0.87 0.23 0.38 0.07 0.51 0.03 
Relationship Length 2.80 0.54 4.50 1.18 7.89 1.02 
  N=30 N=6 N=36 
 
There is a very striking effect of pre-downturn surplus sharing on successful reconnection: Higher 
previous surplus offers have a positive effect on successful reconnection and a negative effect on worker 
rejection of reconnection (i.e., workers tend to reconnect more often if the employer shared more surplus). 
In fact, Table 7 shows that the average predownturn surplus sharing of succesful reconnections is 0.50 – 
the 50-50 split. If the worker share was less than this, firms attempt to reconnect but will be refused by 
                                                 
17 Note the sample sizes are low (N=79) because downturns are rare (δ<=0.1), so strong results are 
unlikely to emerge. 
Table 7: Characteristics of pre-downturn contracts and post-downturn relationships: 50-
50 surplus sharing leads to reconnections.
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nection: Higher previous surplus offers have a positive effect on successful reconnection
and a negative effect on worker rejection of reconnection (i.e., workers tend to reconnect
more often if the employer shared more surplus). In fact, Table 7 shows that the average
predownturn surplus sharing of succesful reconnections is 0.51 - close to the 50-50 split.
If the worker share was less than this, firms attempt to reconnect but will be refused by
workers. If the worker’s share was more than this, firms do not attempt to reconnect.
The firms attempt and reciprocation from worker also depends on relationship length
and wages offered. In conclusion, strong loyalty norm can protect relationships against
stochastic interruptions: good workers and fair firms reconnect after the downturn.
5 Conclusion
This paper replicates the important experimental paper on wage-effort gift exchange
by Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004) and extends it by creating exogenous layoff periods
(“downturns” in which firms cannot hire for three periods). The key feature of their
design, compared to earlier experiments, is that firms can make private offers that can
only be accepted by a specified worker. The result is that a “two-tiered labor market”
emerges spontaneously (even there are no true skill differences among workers). Some
firms make public offers which any worker can accept and others lock in to “relational
contracts” in which they make repeated offers to the same worker period after period.
Firms sometimes “fire” their worker-by not repeating their private offer– if the worker’s
effort is too low, compared to a nonbinding level of effort requested by the firm. It is
crucial to note that these are truly implicit long-term contracts since they only last one
period, and there is no explicit communication at all that supports the relationship or
clarifies what is expected, except for the time course of wages, effort requests, and actual
efforts.
Our experiments replicate the basic patterns of contracting, wages and effort in BFF1
quite closely using two different subject pools and extending number of contracting pe-
riods from 15 to 30. Wage, effort, private offers, and relationship length are remarkably
consistent.
The novel contribution of our paper is exploring the effect of exogeneous temporary
drops in labor demand (firm downturns). We explored the hypothesis that anticipating
stochastic downturn would undermine relational contracting. In a rational framework the
lower capitalized that long-run value of a relational contract will lead workers to exert
low effort and firms to expect low effort and pay lower wages. On the other hand, if the
market is driven by strong “loyalty” norms that firms rehire their old (pre-downturn)
workers then relational contracting might be immune to disruptions.
Consistent with the theoretical prediction, job rents in downturns are lower. This
leads to shorter relationships: the average relationship length in private contracts are
8% lower in downturn and there is a 13% increase in trade taking place in relationship
where partners’ total trading history is 4 periods or less. Suprisingly, average wages in
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downturn are higher.18 Since average effort remains the same, this results in a shift of
surplus sharing towards the workers.
The reason for this is the delayed separation of public and private contracts in labor
market with downturns. In the baseline markets, firms provide a private offer bonus to
workers in terms of higher wages and better surplus sharing compared to public offers.
In the earlier periods of downturn, not only is the private offer bonus missing, but the
surplus sharing is actually less fair than public offers. Renewal rates of comparable effort
levels are also lower in downturns. One possibility is that firms in downturn correctly
anticipated that with other firms unable to hire due to downturns, workers will compete
harder for jobs. However, firms’ initial strategy of demanding more from a worker before
extending long term relationships actually backfired and resulted in higher reservation
prices for workers (in the form of a much improved temporary market). The net effect
is that firms’ bargaining power is reduced and firms ended up paying much more for the
same level of effort. Overall the result suggests that in this finitely repeated contracting
game, delay in forming relationships can have long lasting repercussions.
We observe the following loyalty norms. When downturn prevents firms from hiring,
workers left unemployed go to a lower quality (short term) market where contracts are
lower in wage and surplus sharing. Workers grabbed offers if they get them. When
firms return from the downturn, there is a very striking effect of pre-downturn surplus
sharing on successful reconnection. The average predownturn surplus sharing of succesful
reconnections is 0.50 - the 50-50 split that has appeared frequently in various laboratory
and field experiments. If the worker share was less than this, firms attempt to reconnect
but will be refused by workers. If the worker’s share was more than this, firms do not
attempt to reconnect.
A nice property of the gift exchange paradigm is that one can think of many follow-up
experiments to do next. The downturns here are independent across firms, but one could
correlate them in order to study business cycle effects. Typically downturn lengths are
stochastic rather than lasting a fixed number of periods, as well, which is an easy design
feature to change to measure the impact of uncertain downturn lengths.
6 Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures
18BFF2 studied relational contracting under full employment by inverting the labor market conditions
of BFF1; their market is populated by 10 firms and 7 workers. Relationship lengths in BFF2 are shorter,
confirming field studies (Bleakely et al., 1999) that workers are more likely to quit their jobs under full
employment than when unemployment prevails. However, the lower frequency of long-term relationships
does not affect aggregate performance across labor market conditions because it is compensated for by
higher performance in short-term relationships. With no unemployment, high-performing workers receive
higher wage offers from their current firm than from outside firms. This motivates workers to perform
at a high level of effort, rather than to shirk and then switch firms.
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APPENDIX: 
 
Fig 1: Figure: Surplus sharing as a function of the relationship length (in percentage of total experiment 
trading periods). Thirty period LC sessions are compared to 15 period BFF sessions by binning 
relationship length into fractions of entire trading period. For example fraction 0-1/5 indicated relationship 
lengths up to 5 (out of 30) periods in fLC and  up to 2 (out of 15) periods in BFF.   
 
Surplus sharing in very short relationship (temp market) is filled with shirking, hence benefits workers. 
Then in entry level of the high tier relationship, the workers put in their dues to gain trust of the firm, 
sacrificing their share. As the relationship grows, the surplus sharing becomes more equal.  
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The downturn market shows the same pattern except that because wages are higher in downturns, this 
allows workers in temp market to gain a much larger share of the surplus.  
 
 
Figure 4: Surplus sharing (y) as a function of relations ip length (x).
In the top panel, 30 period baseline LC sessions are compared to 15 period BFF sessions
by binning relationship length into fractions of entire trading period. For example fraction
0-1/5 indicated relationship lengths up to 5 (out of 30) periods in fLC and up to 2 (out
of 15) periods in BFF. Surplus sharing in shortest relationship (temp market) is filled
with shirking, which hence benefits workers. The next shortest relationships are entry
level of the high tier relationship where workers put in their dues to gain trust of the
firm, sacrificing their share. As the relationship grows, the surplus sharing becomes more
equal. The bottom panel shows the similarity of downturn sessions with the baseline
session. Because wages are higher, workers in temp market gain a much larger share of
the surplus when they shirk.
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Fig 2: With stochastic interruptions, relational contracting is preserved. The figure below pool Caltech 
and UCLA subjects. Top left: Suprisingly average wages are higher in the second half in Downturn (dotted 
lines) than it is in Baseline (solid lines black for LC, gray for BFF).  Top right: Average delivered effort. 
Bottom left: Fraction of contracting through private offers. Bottom right: Fraction of contracting as a 
function of relationship length. 
 
Figure 5: Wages, effort, private offers and relationship lengths in Baseline (solid) com-
pared to Downturn (dotted).
The top left panel illustrates that average wages are suprisingly higher in the second
half in Downturn (dotted lines) than it is in Baseline (solid lines black for LC, gray for
BFF). The top right panel and bottom left panel shows no difference in average delivered
effort or in fraction of contracting through private offers. The bottom right panel shows
that relationships are shorter in downturns. Graph shows data pooled from Caltech and
UCLA subjects.
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Table 2: Models of wage determination (accepted wages) 
 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   
Downturn 2.99* 2.54* 2.42*** 11.31** 
 (1.30)   (1.08) (0.46)  (3.61)   
Desired effort 5.46*** 5.47*** 4.67*** 4.80*** 
 (0.34)   (0.30) (0.28)  (0.32)   
Relationship Length 0.68***          
 (0.07)       
A.r.l     16.92*** 15.31*** 17.19*** 
    (2.49) (2.03)  (2.89)   
Private       7.74*** 9.94*** 
    (1.65)  (1.43)   
Period       0.11** 0.12* 
    (0.04)  (0.05)   
lastPeriod       -1.82* -1.81* 
    (0.9)  (0.9)   
UCLA       -2.87*** -3.09*** 
    (0.77)  (0.83)   
Dturn* Desired effort           -0.38  
      (0.51)   
Dturn*A.r.l           -4.36  
      (3.64)   
Dturn*Private           -4.08  
      (2.97)   
Dturn*Period           0.00  
      (0.07)   
Intercept -11.12*** -15.05*** -13.78*** -17.62*** 
 (3.28)   (3.03)  (2.9)  (3.16)   
N 2105           
Adj R2 0.62  0.63  0.67  0.68  
 
Table 8: Determinants of accepted wages.
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Table 3: Difference between Private Contracts and Public Offers (between the 
two tiers) are diminished by downturn. 
 
    Baseline Downturn 
 
                     diff diffSE    diff diffSE 
Offers: 
Wage                18.30   0.93   10.89   0.92 
Desired Effort       0.78   0.16    1.25   0.16 
Worker/Total Surplus 0.16   0.01    0.01   0.01 
 
Contracts: 
Wage                25.28   1.10   16.27   1.01 
Desired Effort       2.07   0.18    1.58   0.18 
Worker/Total Surplus 0.18   0.02    0.05   0.02 
Relationship Length  8.04   0.30    6.00   0.25 
A.r.l      0.25   0.02    0.17   0.02 
 
Actual: 
Delivered Effort      4.29   0.21   3.20   0.18 
Suprise               1.02   0.19   0.36   0.15 
Buyer Profit         17.65   1.31  15.72   1.39 
Seller Profit        16.08   0.81   9.06   0.80 
Worker/Total Surplus -0.06   0.04  -0.20   0.06 
Renewed Immediately  -0.61   0.03  -0.58   0.03 
 
 
Table 9: Difference between private and public contracts are diminished in downturn.
 
 
Table 5: Contracts before, during, and after downturns15
 
  
1.Firm:  
Pre-downturn 
2. Worker: 
Interim 
3. Firm: 
Post-downturn 
  Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E 
Wage 41.81 2.20 33.84 1.51 41.00 1.99 
Desired Effort 7.90 0.33 7.83 0.23 8.20 0.29 
Offered Surplus 0.39 0.02 0.29 0.02 0.35 0.02 
Fraction Private 0.80 0.05 0.67 0.04 0.78 0.05 
Relationship Length 5.71 0.66 2.88 0.23 5.87 0.70 
Delivered Effort 7.03 0.37 5.90 0.28 7.09 0.36 
ExpectedEffort 7.16 0.35 6.23 0.24 7.41 0.31 
Suprise -0.13 0.17 -0.33 0.18 -0.32 0.16 
Buyer Profit 28.47 2.25 25.14 1.84 29.87 2.29 
Seller Profit 30.76 1.56 25.35 1.11 29.94 1.44 
Actual Surplus 0.64 0.09 0.68 0.08 0.60 0.07 
Renewed Immediately 0.61 0.06 0.46 0.05 0.57 0.06 
  N=79 N=118 N=70 
 
 
Firms try to squeeze a little bit upon return (lowering surplus offers from 0.39 to 0.35) (Table 5 
Column 3). From the 70 firms returning from downturn, 40 tried to reconnect with previous workers. 
Reconnection attempts depends mostly on Effort last delivered, and relationship length (Table 6 Model 3). 
The 30 other firms attempted other workers (14) or public offers (16).16 6 reconnection attempts were 
rebuffed by workers, and 2 public offers were grabbed by previous workers, thus continuing the 
relationship. In the end, the reconnection rate was 54%.   
Table 6 Model 3 and 4 model the reconnection norms.17 “Firm attempted” is 1 if the firm made a 
private offer to its previous employee;and “Pair reconnected” is 1 if the firm made such an offer and it was 
accepted. More interim job search lowers the chance that firms attempt to reconnect, and that workers 
accept reconnection offers, which supports our model of strong reconnection norms. 
                                                 
15 Move this to Appendix? 
16 The public offers made by returning firms are often more generous in surplus sharing that average public offers 
(the mean returning firms’ public offer is 0.37 as opposed to 0.29), which help keep the high surplus sharing norms in 
the downturn  public offer. 
 
17 Note the sample sizes are low (N=79) because downturns are rare (δ<=0.1), so strong results are 
unlikely to emerge. 
Table 10: Cont acts before, during, and af er downturns.
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7 Appendix: Proofs
Proposition 2.1
Proof : Selfish workers will always provide e = 1 in the one period game. Fair worker
will shirk if a contract is unfair, hence firms are restricted to making fair offers wˆ(e) =
5e − c(e)/2. Firm’s expected utility for making a fair offer for effort level e is pi(e) =
p(10e − wˆ(e)) − (1 − p)(10 − wˆ(e)) = 10pe − wˆ(e) + 10 − 10p. Since there is an excess
supply of labor and because firms do not have any information about individual workers’
fairness, there is competition among workers for firms and no competition between firms
for workers.19 This allows firms to maximize their profit. Taking a derivative of pi(e)
over wˆ(e) and substituting c(e) for wˆ(e), we find that firm’s profit is maximized when
c′(e) = 20p− 10. Since c′(e) = 1 for e = 2,c′(e) = 2 for 3 ≤ e ≤ 8, c′(e) = 3 for e > 8, we
can solve for minimum and p that support each effort level and arrive at the PBE above.
Proposition 2.2
Proof : The steps of our proof are adapted from BFF2 for multiple firms and excess
supply of labor. We prove this more generally for any e˜T , e˜t for all t < T , w = wˆ(e˜)
when p = .6, which includes e˜T = 8,e˜t = 10.
Step 1 (behavior of fair workers): All fair workers will always perform the desired
effort since all wages will be fair.
Step 2 (behavior of selfish workers): In final period T, since there are no unmatched
firms, value of unemployment UT = 5. Since VT = wˆ(e˜T ) > UT , it is a uniquely best
strategy of the selfish worker to accept the contract of the incumbent firm and then
deliver e = 1. In any period t < T , since firms renew their private offers when workers
deliver requested effort, expected future utility of not shirking is:
Vt = wˆ(e˜t)− c(e˜t) + Vt+1 (4)
and since firms who experienced shirking do not offer private contracts to workers who
were previously matched and after t = 1 public offers are [5, 1], expected future utility of
not shirking is:
Ut = 5 + Ut+1 (5)
Since Vt+1 − Ut+1 > c(e˜t) for all e˜t above, it is therefore the best strategy for et = e˜t.
Step 3 (firm behavior): Given the discussion in Prop 2.1 firms are not under competi-
tion for workers and can maximize profits at all periods. Since p = .6, firms’ are indifferent
between contracts of c′(e) = 2 at period T. At period T-1, firm offers [wˆ(e˜T−1), e˜T−1] that
corresponds to e˜T that was previously chosen (Table 2 Row 5). For e˜T > 4, e˜T−1 = 10
can be supported, and hence e˜t = 10 for all t < T . For e˜T ≤ 4, T-1 offers are e˜T−1 = 9
for e˜T = 4 and e˜T−1 = 7 for e˜T = 3. These two period T and T-1 can then support
19Suppose Firm A and B make an offer to the same person, who rejects A for B. Firm B and the
worker are then matched, and Firm A can make another offer to the remaining n > 1 workers as a
monopolist. Since time is not costly, there is no loss of utility here for Firm A for losing its initial worker
to Firm B.
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e˜t = 10 for all t < T − 1. All firms are matched initially at t = 1 through identical
public offers of [59, 10], in equilibrium all following offers are private renewals to previous
trading partner. Hence n− 2 workers remain unemployed for all t.
Proposition 2.3
Proof : As before, let jt = wˆ(e˜t) − c(e˜t). Without downturn, job rents are equal to
difference in earnings from current period and expected job rents from future periods.
Vt − Ut = jt + Vt+1 − 5− Ut+1 = jt − 5 + (Vt+1 − Ut+1)
where VT − UT = wT for selfish types and wT − c(eT ) for fair types.
With downturn, job rents are
V δt −U δt = (1−δ)(jt+V δt+1)+δµ(jt+V δt+1)+δ(1−µ)(5+jt+1+V δt+2)−µ(jt+V δt+1)−(1−µ)(5+U δt+1)
Simplifying we arrive at
= (1− µ) [(1− δ)(jt − 5) + (δ − µ)(jt+1 + V δt+2)− (1− µ)(5 + U δt+2)]
= (1− µ) [(1− δ)(jt − 5)− µ(jt+1 − 5 + (V δt+2 − U δt+2) + δjt+1 − 5 + δV δt+2 − U δt+2]
= (1− µ) [(1− δ)(jt − 5)− µ(δVt+1 − Ut+1)]
where V δT − U δT = (1− µ)(1− δ)(VT − UT ).
(i) Since jt > 5 for all eT > 1 and Vt+1 > Ut+1, job rents are always positive.
(ii) Since current period job rent jt− 5 is discounted by (1− µ)(1− δ) and future period
rents are also discounted, job rents are lower in the downturn.
Proposition 2.4
Proof : The strategy profile describes a very strong reconnection norm (µ = 1). We prove
that this reconnection norm is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with the following steps:
Step 1 (behavior of fair workers): All fair workers will always perform the desired
effort since all wages will be fair.
Step 2 (behavior of selfish workers): As in the baseline case, it is a unique best
strategy of the selfish worker to accept the contract of the incumbent firm at T and
perform eT = 1. It is also best response to not shirk, since no firms make private offers
to previously employed workers, driving the outside option to 5.
Step 3 (firm not hit by downturn at t = 1): Proof follows the baseline case. We now
show that if a worker shirks, the firm’s best response is to extend a private offer to never
employed workers or to make a public offer of [5, 1]. Given out of equilibrium belief that
only selfish workers shirk, when no firms are hit by a downturn, all previously employed
workers are selfish. When the other firm is in downturn, his previously employed worker
enters the pool of unemployed workers for one period. If the firm can identify this worker,
the best strategy is to privately offer him the single period contract of [46, 8], since the
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worker will return to his employer after the downturn.20 However, since firms only observe
which workers are employed but do not observe pairings between workers and firms, it
cannot perfectly identify this worker. Because the population has n − 1 selfish workers
and one worker with probability .6 of being fair, the firm cannot do better than to offer
[5, 1].
Step 4 (firm hit by downturn at t = 1): If the firm competes with an incumbent
firm for his worker, he will earn 0 profit, which is lower than the profit of 5 from public
offer of [5, 1]. Hence a firm unable to make offers at the first period make offers to never
employed workers. Given out of equilibrium belief that only selfish workers shirk and the
inability to perfectly identify workers left by downturn in Step 3, firms cannot do better
than to make a public offer of [5, 1].
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